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The World Economy 
The much predicted upturn in the 
world economy is proving rather 
elusive. Many countries are now 
revising downwards their fore-
casts for key economic variables 
for 1982, 1983 and beyond. The 
OECD has already reduced its July 
forecasts for growth world-wide 
to fall from 0.5% to zero. Not 
only will the start of the upturn 
be later than expected, but the 
recovery is also likely to be of 
a lower magnitude. Indeed 
whilst inflation is proving 
reluctant to fall from an average 
of approximately 8% worldwide 
there remain doubts about how a 
recovery can be sustained, given 
the confidence-sapping effect of 
high inflationary expectations. 
The industrialised countries, notably the UK and USA, where tight monetary 
policies have been implemented, are beginning to reduce their inflation 
rates. Whilst a recovery in some of the major industrial countries may be 
a necessary prerequisite to stimulate a more widespread economic revival it 
is unlikely to be sufficient unless other countries are able to participate 
in international markets. The developing countries have an important role 
but are severely burdened by large international debts which have grown out 
of their difficulties in financing earlier balance of payments deficits. 
Between 1975 and 1982 there has been a five-fold increase in developing 
country debt service payments. Unfortunately, much of this debt is concen-
trated in short maturity bonds whose interest rates have risen in line with 
the general domestic rate structures. Compounding their difficulties, the 
developing countries have had to contend with historically low commodity 
prices, as a result of the lack of demand from the major manufacturing 
nations. Some non-oil commodity prices are currently at pre-1970 levels. 
As a result, the terms of trade of developing countries have worsened, 
export prices of commodities falling whilst import prices have risen in line 
with inflation. Developing countries must now sell more in order to 
protect their purchasing capacity, and hence the standard of living in these 
countries. Ten years ago five tons of tea would have paid for a tractor, 
but at current prices thirteen tons of tea are required. 
Not surprisingly under these circumstances many countries are unable to meet 
their debt payments and are requesting 're-scheduling' arrangements from the 
international banking system. The downward trend in nominal interest rates 
will, of course, reduce the debt burden but as real interest rates remain at 
high levels the non-oil, non-NIC developing countries are still unlikely to 
increase substantially their purchases of manufactured goods. 
For many countries, notably Peru, Brazil, Mexico and some Eastern Bloc 
nations, the ratio of debt to the level of export revenues is well in excess 
of 30$. The average worldwide is around 19.5%. At these levels the 
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banking system has itself become vulnerable, with losses already being made 
by some US and German overseas banks. At a time when the prospects for an 
upturn might be expected to rely critically on an easing of international 
credit restrictions, it is likely that the banks and agencies will impose 
tighter conditions on their loans to developing countries. Yet without the 
full participation of the Third World in international trade any recovery 
will be weakened. 
Historically, the development process has always generated net borrowing, 
and as such the present concern over re-scheduling may be excessive. In 
many ways, the process of "re-scheduling" is no different from the similar 
technique of "rolling-over" fiscal debts. High interest rates have been 
largely responsible for most of the financing problems of the developing 
countries. These high interest rates have originated in the advanced 
countries, as a result of policies designed to counteract domestic 
inflation, and to protect the external value of their currencies. But it 
may be argued that the current signs of recovery in the advanced countries 
may owe as much to the low level of import prices as it does to the effect-
iveness of domestic monetary policy. If primary commodity prices rise over 
the next year, as they are forecast to do, then this will simultaneously 
have the effect of lightening the debt burden of the developing countries, 
but at the same time it will add to the inflationary stimulus within the 
advanced countries. It is clear that the weak recovery anticipated for the 
next twelve months in the economies of the advanced countries would be 
jeopardised by any significant further increases in inflationary pressures. 
Already some countries are beginning to divorce themselves from the strict 
confines of monetarism. This will mean that interest rates may soon cease 
to be the dominant instrument of economic policy. Unfortunately, it is 
likely that economic policy will increasingly switch to an emphasis on 
balance of payments problems, in which the main instruments look like being 
a series of import restrictions designed to protect industrial economies 
from cheap imports. 
Whether the eventual recovery in the world economy will be weak or strong 
will depend critically on the performance of the United States economy. 
Since October 1979 the level of short term interest rates has been 
determined by the weekly figures of the M1 definition of money. Last 
month, Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, promised that 
for the future direction of monetary policy less emphasis would be attached 
to the M1 figures. As a result, interest rates are expected to continue 
falling, helping to ensure that the US economy will grow, probably by around 
3%, in 1983, despite recent production figures showing a 0.6% fall in real 
GDP in September. During 1983 the recovery will be sustained by a further 
10% cut in income tax. These clarifications of US policy will have the 
added benefit of removing some of the uncertainty about future policy which 
has often been blamed for the high interest rates worldwide. 
Like other industrial nations, West Germany is revising its forecasts for 
1983, and it is expected that the 1982 outcome will be for a real drop in 
output of \% whilst 1983 should see a 1% real growth - but only if the 
recovery in international trade actually materialises. Although inflation 
is expected to fall to around 5% by the end of 1982 and up to 4% next year, 
an increase in VAT of 1? is expected to come into effect in July 1983. 
2 
France a lso expects a fu r ther f a l l in domestic i n f l a t i o n to around 12% for 
1982. In June t he f r anc was deva lued in an a t t e m p t t o reduce t h e t r a d e 
d e f i c i t . Without d e v a l u a t i o n t h e d e f i c i t might have been around £8.9 
b i l l i o n compared with the expected £7.2 b i l l i o n a f t e r deva lua t ion . France 
o p e r a t e s a minimum wage p o l i c y , which has been promoted by the M i t t e r a n d 
government . Minimum wage l e v e l s have been i n c r e a s e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y in 
r e l a t i o n t o both average e a r n i n g s and d o m e s t i c p r i c e s , e f f e c t i v e l y 
t h r e a t e n i n g t h e employment p r o s p e c t s of many young p e o p l e . F u r t h e r 
inc reases in unemployment, and e s p e c i a l l y youth unemployment are expected as 
a r e s u l t . 
The pe r fo rmance of t he J a p a n e s e economy never f a i l s t o amaze. After a 
r emarkab ly s t r o n g s u r g e in consumer spending between A p r i l and June the 
economy should see 3A% growth for 1982 as a whole. Even t h i s i s a d i s ap -
p o i n t m e n t fo r such a g r o w t h - o r i e n t e d c o u n t r y . But i t i s u n l i k e l y to 
encourage a f u r t h e r r e v a l u a t i o n of t h e yen, u n l e s s of cou r se such a p o l i c y 
i s regarded as expedient to avoid p r o t e c t i o n i s t measures being introduced by 
e x p o r t c u s t o m e r s . Consequen t ly , e x p o r t s a r e not expec ted to make any 
con t r i bu t ion to growth next year . 
W h i l s t most c o u n t r i e s do indeed expec t a r ecove ry next y e a r , i t i s c l e a r 
from the major i n d u s t r i a l na t ions t h a t only a weak recovery i s a n t i c i p a t e d . 
Despite t h i s pessimism, stock markets throughout the world are pushing up 
p r i c e s t o l e v e l s which a r e a l r e a d y d i s c o u n t i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l economic 
recovery for which economists can find no evidence. 
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The U.K. Economy 
In c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s t h e o u t l o o k 
fo r t h e UK economy i s b e t t e r than 
for some y e a r s . At j u s t over 
7%, i n f l a t i o n i s a t i t s l o w e s t 
for over 10 years and i s expected 
to f a l l f u r t h e r . Prime i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s have a g a i n been c u t i n 
r e c e n t weeks and a t 9% a r e a t 
t h e i r l o w e s t l e v e l for n e a r l y 5 
y e a r s , and f u r t h e r c u t s a r e 
e x p e c t e d . Mortgage r a t e s w i l l 
almost c e r t a i n t l y be reduced t h i s 
month, with b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t s on 
i n f l a t i o n and personal d i sposable 
incomes. P roduc t iv i ty improved 
a g a i n t h i s y e a r , a l b e i t a t a 
s l o w e r r a t e than in 1981 , t h e 
publ ic s ec to r borrowing r e q u i r e -
ments i s l e s s t han a n t i c i p a t e d , 
and t h e r e i s s t i l l a h e a l t h y 
b a l a n c e of p a y m e n t s s u r p l u s . 
F i n a l l y , the average inc rease in 
t h e l e v e l of a n n u a l p a y 
s e t t l e m e n t s has been reduced t o 
10% in l i n e w i t h G o v e r n m e n t 
a s p i r a t i o n s , 
In s p i t e of t he se favourable i n d i c a t i o n s , and the e x i s t e n c e of s u b s t a n t i a l 
excess c a p a c i t y , t he r e i s no sign of any recovery in output and f o r e c a s t s of 
movements in output are p e s s i m i s t i c . I n d u s t r i a l product ion i s s t a t i c and 
l i t t l e or no g rowth in g r o s s d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t i s e x p e c t e d t h i s y e a r . 
Moreover , a l t h o u g h most f o r e c a s t e r s were p r e d i c t i n g growth of 2%-3% in 
output in 1983, s i m i l a r f o r e c a s t s were being made t h i s t ime l a s t year with 
r e s p e c t t o 1982, and s h o r t - t e r m f o r e c a s t s a r e a l r e a d y be ing r e v i s e d 
downwards. 
As in previous y e a r s , the lack of growth cannot be a t t r i b u t e d so l e ly to the 
lack of e f f e c t i v e demand. In the f i r s t t h ree q u a r t e r s of 1982, the volume 
of d o m e s t i c demand i s e s t i m a t e d to have i n c r e a s e d by abou t 3% over t h e 
corresponding period in 1981. Over the same per iod , the volume of imports 
has i n c r e a s e d by over 12%. To put i t in a d i f f e r e n t way, for every M 
i nc rease in the volume of expend i tu re , roughly 0.8? i s met by impor t s . On 
t h i s k ind of a r i t h m e t i c , d o u b l e - d i g i t g rowth in demand would be needed t o 
genera te a r a t e of output growth s u f f i c i e n t to s u s t a i n , l e t alone inc rease 
the present depressed l e v e l of employment. 
The n a t u r a l r e s p o n s e t o t h i s has been a growing demand f o r a r e d u c t i o n in 
the s t e r l i n g exchange r a t e , or for p r o t e c t i o n . If i t i s thought t h a t p r i c e 
c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s i s t h e major p rob lem, then a d e p r e c i a t i o n of t h e exchange 
r a t e i s g r e a t l y p r e f e r a b l e t o p r o t e c t i o n a s a means of r e s o t r i n g 
compe t i t i venes s , for a v a r i e t y of reasons inc lud ing the r i s k of r e t a l i a t i o n , 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s under GATT and o t h e r t r a d e a g r e e m e n t s , and t h e 
f ac t t h a t s e l e c t i v e import c o n t r o l s would have highly undes i r ab le e f f e c t s on 
resource a l l o c a t i o n . Indeed, t he re i s a c e r t a i n irony in the whole debate 
on i m p o r t c o n t r o l s in c i r c u m s t a n c e s of f l o a t i n g exchange r a t e s , s i n c e a 
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strong argument in favour of floating rates was alleged to be automatic 
adjustment to relative changes in international competitiveness. This 
however failed to anticipate the impact of North Sea Oil on the sterling 
exchange rate. Despite the serious economic and political implications-
however. protective measures are on the increase in many countries 
including the UK and more trade restrictions are probable. 
While there may be reason to query the assumption that uncompetitive prices 
are the only or even the main cause of the lack of growth in the UK economy, 
a reduction in the sterling exchange rate is probably desirable and the most 
appealing policy option for a government reluctant to boost effective demand 
more directly. To achieve this reduction, further reductions in interest 
rates, and a relaxation of the present fiscal stance will be necessary, and 
there are already signs of movement in this direction. Higher public 
sector capital expenditure is being encouraged, and tax cuts of £2-£3billion 
are anticipated. The Chancellor's announcement on 8 November of a further 
cut in the national insurance surcharge is a first step in the direction of 
fiscal stimulus. At the same time, the government is hoping to offset the 
potential inflationary impact of higher import prices and monetary growth by 
restraining pay settlements in the public sector. 
Although circumstances are propitious for a modest expansion in output, 
business confidence is low and there is as yet no indication of the increase 
in investment necessary for a sustained longer-tem recovery. Given the 
traumatic shocks of the past three years, industry may be slow to respond to 
relatively modest changes in the exchange rate and in the level of domestic 
demand, and more substantial pump-priming may be needed to make any impact 
on current unemployment levels. As noted above, however, the high level of 
import propensity means that even a moderately-large growth in demand may 
not encourage significant growth in output and employment, and may instead 
lead to the familiar cycle of balance of payments problems, sterling 
depreciation and higher import prices, and renewed inflation. 
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